Well, help me to be a "fact-monger" then. Pro-activity is far preferred to reactivity. Murphy's Law is a good source of inspiration towards foresight, it would seem evident. Is there a better stance?
This issue is also relevant to those that use XPMode as well, BTW.
Perhaps we could refer to a statement (by perhaps number one fear-monger :lol):
Microsoft wrote:"Important
As of April 8, 2014, technical support for Windows XP and Windows XP Mode is no longer available, including updates that help protect your PC. This means that if you continue to use Windows XP or use Windows XP Mode on a Windows 7 PC after support ends, your PC might become more vulnerable to security risks and viruses. Therefore, to keep your Windows 7 PC secure after support ends, we recommend that you only use Windows XP Mode if your PC is disconnected from the Internet."
quoted from: http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/wind … -windows-7
Here are some more aspects:
ChrisH wrote:"I have XP-specific applications that won't run under wine or any later windows, as well as some windows-only applications, so for me an XP VM is an absolute requirement, which I've given some thought to.
You are at risk, but you can bring the risk down to an acceptable level by:
1. Not browsing in the VM - do that in the host, copy files across as required.
2. If there's some bizarre reason why you really must browse in the guest, throw all the browser-based security you can at it (strict noscript etc.) and only for the sites you really have to (and see item 4.).
3. Cutting out all non-essential services from XP (especially network-related ones, but note that networking is used to share folders to the host.
4. Running your VM from a file system that appears to be called immutable in the docs - it's reset to the starting conditions on shutdown. I asked about this here.
5. or running still-supported security software on the guest (it's no use if you can't keep it up-to-date, which you can't if loads from immutable storage).
6. Firewalling the VM on the host (which I haven't done properly yet, so can't go into more detail, but basically close all the ports to start with)."
quoted from Apr 30 at 15:43: http://askubuntu.com/questions/458306/v … e-browsing
Here is one possible reason for recommending a linux VM. That is, the very nature of not only the OS, yet some of the malware itself.
Joshua Cannell wrote:"It’s not so much what it can do, rather, it doesn’t want to do anything. Since average PC users don’t run their OS within a VM, it’s suspicious to be running in a virtual environment from the malware’s standpoint, as it drastically increases the likelihood that’s being analyzed and/or reverse engineered. This is something the malware’s creator wants to prevent."
quoted from: http://blog.malwarebytes.org/intelligen … mment-5861
Of course, that doesn't preclude infection, just further aberrant behavior for the most part.
Virtual machine hosts can be vulnerable, even linux hosts.
ggalaxy wrote:"A successful attack from Windows users will be as follows ;
* You installed wine application in ubuntu
* you forget to configure UFW (the firewall)
* you unintentionally clicked on a malware link from your win xp virtual box
* you opened ports and didn't secure them
. In your case, you are going to install WINDOWS XP in Virtual box, and VBox will create a disk image which will be impossible for users to get outside the disk image and mess with your Ubuntu, however, if you have wine in your ubuntu, and wrongly clicked a malware link from your Win XP virtual box, that will lead the attacker to your ubuntu and execute commands and harm your computer."
quoted from Jan 9 at 20:21: http://askubuntu.com/questions/403079/i … for-ubuntu
Apologies for not expanding upon security in VMWare. Am hoping more people will offer insight.
Then again, there's the whole current flawed trust model.
Dan Goodin wrote:"Of 3.45 million real-world connections made to Facebook servers using the transport layer security (TLS) or secure sockets layer protocols, 6,845, or about 0.2 percent of them, were established using forged certificates. The vast majority of unauthorized credentials were presented to computers running antivirus programs from companies including Bitdefender, Eset, and others. Commercial firewall and network security appliances were the second most common source of forged certificates."
quoted from: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/05 … tificates/
Few do think of updating those RootCerts & getting the current revocation update. The RootCerts package is only an optional update for the masses, and curiously hasn't seen an update since before the HeartBleed revelation.
How long ago did schannel.dll (TLS/SSL) see an update?
The latest i see for w2k is v5.1.2195.6960 from Apr 8, 2005. That must be vulnerable in so many ways.
The latest for xp is v5.1.2600.6370 from Mar 28, 2013, so that should be OK for at least a little while. That seems to indicate pro-activity on MS's part.
2k3's latest is v5.2.3790.5014 from June 4, 2012. Curious that the supported OS has the older implementation, unless i have miscalculated the latest update for 2k3. (25000 Servers a day need 2k3 updated before July of next year???)
Is that the revision of schannel.dll in XPMode?
"Secure channel (aka SChannel) - Introduced in Windows 2000 and updated in Windows Vista to support stronger AES encryption and ECC [6] This provider uses SSL/TLS records to encrypt data payloads. (schannel.dll)"
quoted from: url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secur … _Interface
XP lacks support for stronger AES encryption and ECC? I think the availability of something like P-521 or greater is something that should be available in today's day & age (especially in light of recent WPA2 vulnerabilities - recommendations of usage of greater complexity encryption at minimum.
There is an update for 2k3 to support AES256-SHA at least. https://support.microsoft.com/kb/948963
Perhaps one approach would be to disable support for the lowest and least secure ciphers. See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245030. Those could go into the changelog.
Anyway, how should an advisory read (perhaps in addition to "* use at your own risk *" in networking packs) ?
"Avoid networking entirely on Win2000 unless it is a private wired and isolated network. XP/2k3 will eventually and not necessarily in succession receive the same recommendation."???
Check the changelogs and see if you disagree moderately to vehemently against any statement within, please.
Integrating official updates into one's source does seem like another proactive approach. Of course, that is a whole other kettle of fish.
There are some recent KB updates for xp that so-far seemingly have improved usb stability/performance from textmode on.
Wouldn't integrating KB network files & related inbuilt protocols/drivers, etc. offer one less flaws and greater stability than what is stock for XPMode? (What is stock in a XPMode distro? I don't know.)
Ooo, XP sees another update, one for SilverLight --> http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download … x?id=42250
Just as well --> http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/05 … -the-rise/
OK; thanks for reminding me about the first post. Will decorate the changelogs and get that up. No wonder that one seems so popular. d'oh. :u